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ABSTRACT 
Six experiments were conducted to test assumptions of a schema- 
maintenance through compensation analysis. The results of 
these experiments indicated that perceivers can compensate for 
the inconsistent action of one individual (the target) by altering 
their attribution concerning the action of a fellow group member. 
When the target performed an inconsistent behavior, perceivers 
compensated by making especially extreme stereotypically consistent 
attributions concerning a fellow group member’s subsequent 
action. In addition, in Experiment 5, perceivers compensated 
via a fellow group member for a target’s inconsistent action while 
maintaining their general view of group members. Experiments 
also provided tests of the capability and motivation assumptions 
of the schema-maintenance through compensation analyses. 
  
A vast body of research on attributional processes has 
generally assumed that causal analysis of a person’s 
behavior is motivated by the person’s need to predict the 
future (see Fiske & Taylor, 1991, for a review; see also 
Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973). Understanding 
the dispositional or situational forces that are 
associated with behavior enables people to feel that they 
can control or at least predict events. Thus, attributions 
are assumed to serve a functional role, contributing to a 
person’s sense of self-efficacy. In addition, attributions 
serve a role in interpersonal relations in influencing, for 
example, the course of social interaction including close 
relationships and intergroup behavior. The use of stereotypes 
is also functional in this context in making the 
social world more predictable (e.g., Allport, 1954; Fiske& 
Taylor, 1991). However, functional utility comes with a 
social cost; stereotypes often are maintained in the face 
of disconfirming evidence that can lead to the perpetuation 
of prejudice and bias. 
 
Research has shown that the type of attribution a 
perceiver makes can influence whether an aberrant 
behavior has an impact on a perceiver’s representation 
of the stereotyped group (e.g., Crocker, Hannah, & 
Weber, 1983; Hewstone, 1989). For example, Crocker 
et al. (1983) found that the type of attribution that was 
made about an inconsistent action influenced the 
impact of the inconsistent action on memory for the 
action and representations of the behavior. The aberrant 
act had a stronger influence on changing representations 
of social groups when it was described as being 
internally, rather than externally, motivated. Further 
research has demonstrated that stereotypes are most 
likely to change when counterstereotypic behaviors are 
performed by group members thought to be typical 
members of outgroups and when these behaviors are 
attributed to stable, internal causes (e.g., Wilder, Simon, & 
Faith, 1996). 
 
There are several perspectives that implicate attributions 
in the process of stereotype maintenance/change 
(e.g., Crocker et al., 1983; Hewstone, 1989; Johnston, 
Bristow,&Love, 2000; J. J. Seta&Seta, 1993; Wilder et al., 
1996; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998). Thus, exploring 
the factors that influence the outcomes of attributional 
search processes is an important area of investigation. In 
our research, we focused on the role of category-based 
expectancies on individuals’ attributions and perceptions 
of a behavior that followed exposure to stereotypically 
inconsistent acts. Specifically, we were interested in 
determining if the nature of perceivers’ attributions was 
influenced by their propensity to compensate for the 
stereotypically inconsistent behaviors of a group member. 
The present research follows from our previous 
work on compensatory motives in social judgment. First, 
we describe this compensatory motivation analysis followed 
by a description of the current research. 
 
 
SCHEMA-MAINTENANCE 
THROUGH COMPENSATION 
 
A schema includes goals, expectations, self-concepts, 
stereotypes, moods, and other such organizing concepts 
and motives. Compensation is not restricted to one type 
of schema or one type of motivation. For example, people 
can compensate in an attempt to maintain a goal, to 
maintain control, or to maintain a particular view of 
themselves or others (e.g., J. J. Seta, Seta,&Erber, 1993; 
J. J. Seta & Seta, 1993). When individuals attempt to 
maintain a schema, they are effectively trying to prevent 
a schema from changing. Thus, this model has particular 
relevance to situations in which individuals attempt to 
preserve their stereotype in the face of disconfirming evidence.1 
In this article, we are concerned with stereotype 
maintenance. According to our view, exposure to 
counterstereotypic behaviors can result in the generation 
of hyperconsistent expectations that the group 
member will conform to the stereotype in the future by 
performing a behavior that is hyperconsistent with the 
stereotype (J. J. Seta&Seta, 1993). For example, observations 
of a member of a social group, typically thought to 
be lacking in intelligence, performing an intellectual 
task may lead individuals to expect that this group member 
would be likely to perform in a manner especially 
lacking in intellectual acuity in the future. This expectation 
may effectively help maintain the negative group 
stereotype. Similarly, individuals may attempt to maintain 
positive stereotypes by generating compensatory 
expectations, such as when observations of a minister 
behaving in an immoral manner lead individuals to 
expect the minister to behave in an ultrarighteous manner 
at a future date. This expectation may or may not 
effectively counter the influences of observed inconsistencies. 
Regardless of whether the generation of 
compensatory expectations effectively maintains the stereotype, 
we should observe the influences of this motive 
on subsequent social judgments under certain 
conditions. 
 
According to our schema-maintenance through compensation 
approach, compensation can occur when an 
event or experience is subjectively inconsistent with a 
stereotype or schema (J. J. Seta & Seta, 1993; J. J. Seta, 
Seta, & Erber, 1993). In this situation, compensation will 
occur when a person has an implicit or explicit motivation 
to maintain the stereotype or schema and the person 
has the capability of generating information (or 
behavior) that could potentially offset the inconsistency. 
In support of this assertion, research has demonstrated 
that cognitive capacity is necessary for stereotype maintenance 
in the face of receiving inconsistent information 
about a target (e.g., Moreno & Bodenhausen, 1999; 
Yzerbyt, Coull, & Rocher, 1999). Individuals are especially 
willing to expend cognitive effort in generating 
compensatory information when, for example, important 
or valued schema are threatened by inconsistent 
information. Therefore, within limits, one’s capability of 
generating information may vary as a function of schema 
importance. 
 
Perceivers’ motivation to compensate should be influenced 
by factors such as the schema’s subjective importance 
(C. E. Seta, Seta, & Goodman, 1998), schema 
strength, and the consequences of maintaining this 
schema. There are also several factors that constrain a 
perceiver’s capability of accessing or generating potentially 
compensating information. These include factors 
such as the frequency and intensity of observed inconsistency. 
As evidence mounts that disconfirms expectations, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to disregard the 
data (e.g., J. J. Seta & Seta, 1982, 1992; Wilson, Lisle, 
Kraft, & Wetzel, 1989). At this point, expectations may 
not be completely guided by schematic knowledge, and 
predictions about the deviant target’s behavior may be 
guided by bottom-up observations of the target’s behavior. 
In this case, the perceiver is basing his or her expectations 
on the observed behavior of the deviant target, and 
perceivers will not expect compensation from the deviant 
actor. 
 
According to our view, even though the perceiver is 
unable to compensate for a target’s inconsistent actions, 
it is possible that the perceiver will expect compensation 
from a different group member. A fellow group member 
and the target of the inconsistent action are related in a 
perceiver’s knowledge structure (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 
1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Therefore, perceivers may 
attempt to maintain their stereotype by expecting the 
future action of a nondeviant group member to compensate 
for the inconsistent actions of a deviant member. 
 
 
There are several reasons why a perceiver can expect 
compensation from a fellow group member under conditions 
in which he or she does not expect compensation 
from a deviant target. First, the assumed variability 
among members of a group is often greater than the 
assumed variability in a single individual’s behavior. For 
example, we generally are not surprised when grades in 
our class range from As to Fs, but we are surprised when 
the grades of a single student range from As to Fs. People 
often expect more behavioral deviance among a group 
of people than within a single individual (e.g., Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1996). This effect also can occur because the 
implications of the inconsistent actions of the deviant 
are more directly tied to the personality of the deviant 
target than to the personality of a fellow group member. 
For both reasons, it should take an objectively less severe 
inconsistent action to constrain a perceiver’s capability 
of generating compensatory expectations about the 
target of the inconsistent actions than a fellow group 
member’s future actions. Likewise, it should take an 
objectively milder inconsistent action to generate compensatory 
expectations for the target than a fellow group 
member. It follows, then, that after a very inconsistent 
action on the part of the target, we may observe compensation 
for a fellow group member but not for the 
target.2 
 
These predictions were supported in a series of experiments 
(C. E. Seta et al., 1998; J. J. Seta & Seta, 1993). In 
one experiment, for example, we found that after a target 
performed a very mild inconsistent action, participants 
generated compensatory expectations about the 
future action of the target; however, following a highly 
inconsistent action, participants generated compensatory 
expectations for the fellow group member but not 
for the acting target. Just as perceivers demonstrate compensatory 
motivation by elevating their future expectations 
of a group member’s actions, the type of attribution 
they make about a group member’s actual behavior also 
may reflect this motive. In particular, individuals may be 
biased toward making more extreme internal attributions 
for a group member cohort’s stereotypically consistent 
behavior in an effort to maintain their existing 
group schema. Thus, an influence of compensatory 
motives on patterns of attributions would be demonstrated 
by finding more extreme dispositional attributions 
for stereotypically consistent behaviors in the presence 
versus the absence of inconsistency. The present 
research explored this possibility. 
 
 
OVERVIEW: EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
 
In these studies, we explored the viability and 
generalizability of the schema-maintenance through 
compensation analysis with respect to participants’ 
interpretations and attributions of potentially compensatory 
behaviors. In all studies, participants were presented 
with the aberrant behavior of a member of a stereotyped 
group, and positive group stereotypes were 
used that are typically associated with either women 
(nurses) or men (ministers). Experimental condition 
participants were exposed to stereotypically inconsistent 
information about a member of one of these groups and 
were asked to make judgments about the causes of a 
stereotypically consistent behavior that was described as 
emanating from the aberrant group member (same target 
conditions) or a fellow member of the target’s social 
group (fellow group member conditions). In addition, 
control conditions were employed in which participants 
were not exposed to stereotypically inconsistent behaviors 
and were asked simply to make judgments about the 
causes of the stereotypically consistent behaviors. 
These controls allowed for an estimate of baseline 
attributions used for reference points in assessing the 
extent to which exposure to inconsistency changed patterns 
of attributions. An influence of compensatory 
motives on patterns of attributions would be demonstrated 
by finding more extreme dispositional attributions 
for stereotypically consistent behaviors in experimental 
versus control conditions. We expected to see 
more extreme attributions about the causes of fellow 
group members’ stereotypic behavior, which are consistent 
with the disposition of the actor, after being exposed 
to the inconsistent behaviors of a target group member. 
Participants would be indicating stronger stereotypically 
consistent dispositional causes for the behavior than 
baseline estimates. The primary purpose of these studies 
was to demonstrate the generalizability of the hypothesized 
effects across materials and stereotypes. Further 
studies, reported in this article, were designed to rule out 
potential alternative explanations, such as contrast 
effects. These findings would dovetail with prior 
research (e.g., C. E. Seta et al., 1998; J. J. Seta & Seta, 
1993) that has found increased expectations for 
stereotypically consistent behaviors on the part of fellow 
group members after exposure to highly inconsistent 
behaviors of an acting group member. 
 
 
 
 
METHOD: EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
 
Stimulus Materials 
 
In all experiments, inconsistent behaviors were chosen 
from a normative set collected for prior research 
(J. J. Seta&Seta, 1993) and were considered to be highly 
inconsistent with the stereotyped group. The target compensatory 
behavior used in Experiments 1 and 2 also was 
selected from these norms. In addition, a separate sample 
of participants was given the target compensatory 
behavior used in these studies. They were asked to 
assume that either a minister (Experiment 1) or a nurse 
(Experiments 2-6) had performed a behavior and were 
asked if this behavior was consistent or inconsistent with 
the internal character of the person’s group. For ministers, 
they were asked to assume that a minister volunteered, 
in the presence of other ministers, to help the 
March of Dimes (a charitable, philanthropic group) 
over the weekend. Then, they were asked which of two 
conclusions for this behavior (he did it because he was 
totally concerned about the March of Dimes or he 
wanted to make a good impression) was most consistent 
and which was most inconsistent with the internal character 
of ministers. Of the 30 participants that were sampled, 
27 believed that the conclusion that suggested that 
the minister helped because he was concerned about the 
March of Dimes was most consistent with the character 
of ministers, X2 = 19.2, p < .001, whereas 28 believed that 
the conclusion that he wanted to make a good impression 
was most inconsistent with the character of ministers, 
X2 = 22.5, p < .001. For nurses, participants were 
asked to assume that a nurse volunteered, in the presence 
of other nurses, to help the March of Dimes over 
the weekend. Then they were asked which of two conclusions 
(she did it because she is a truly generous person or 
because she simply wanted to impress) was most consistent 
and which one was most inconsistent with the internal 
character of nurses. Of the 30 participants, 28 
believed that the conclusion that she was truly generous 
was most consistent, X2= 22.5, p < .001, whereas 29 
believed that the conclusion that she wanted to impress 
was most inconsistent,  X2 = 26.1, p < .001. 
 
 
Participants, Design, and 
Procedure (Experiments 1 and 2) 
 
Experiment 1. Ninety-one women and 21 men participated 
in Study 1. No participant was included as an overlapping 
participant in any of the studies reported in this 
article. Participation was rewarded by the receipt of partial 
credit for the research requirements of introductory 
psychology classes at the University of North Carolina, 
Greensboro. 
 
In Experiment 1, participants were assigned randomly 
to one of four between-subjects conditions 
defined by the factorial crossing of two levels of actor 
inconsistency (a high-inconsistency experimental condition 
and no inconsistency control) with two levels of target 
identity variable (aberrant group member and a fellow 
member condition). The study was conducted in 
small groups where the number per group typically 
ranged from 8 to 12. Participants were told that, in the 
present study, they would be asked their impressions of 
other persons. They were then given written descriptions 
comprising one of the four conditions used in the 
study; all conditions were approximately equally represented 
within each experimental session. 
 
Participants in the high-inconsistency experimental 
condition read about a minister who had sexually 
molested a 7-year-old and sold heroin to a teenager. In 
the same aberrant group member condition, they then 
read that this minister volunteered in the presence of 
other ministers to help the March of Dimes in the forthcoming 
months. They were then asked to consider why 
this minister had volunteered; they rated their attribution 
along a 7-point scale anchored by the endpoints 1 
(to make a good impression) and 7 (he is totally concerned 
about the March of Dimes). 
 
Participants in the fellow group member condition 
read about the inconsistent behaviors of the aberrant 
minister but were told that another minister, unrelated 
to the inconsistent actor, volunteered to help the March 
of Dimes. They were then asked to rate the reason why he 
volunteered along the 7-point scale described above. 
Participants in the two control groups were not 
exposed to inconsistent information about ministers 
and were simply asked to rate the reasons why a minister 
would volunteer or why a different minister would volunteer. 
All participants were asked a probe question serving 
as a manipulation check in which they were asked to indicate 
the identity of the rating target. Following this question, 
participants were thanked and debriefed.3 
Experiment 2. Similar procedures were used in Experiment 
2. However, this study employed 73 female participants. 
In the high-inconsistency conditions, participants 
read a scenario in which they were asked to imagine finding 
a nursing student described as red-faced and grasping 
a frail elderly man by the collar while slapping him in 
the face. A broken glass was described as lying close-by 
on the floor in a puddle of milk. They then read that later 
that week, a member of the community asked Mary to 
donate a great deal of time on a Saturday to help a charitable 
organization. This request was described as made 
in the presence of other persons. 
 
At this point, our manipulation of the attributional 
target was made. Participants in a high-inconsistency– 
same target condition read that Mary was the nursing 
student that they had just read about in the preceding 
scenario (i.e., the aberrant nurse), whereas participants 
in a high-inconsistency–different target condition read 
that Mary was not the nursing student described in the 
preceding scenario but was a different nursing student 
from the one who performed the aberrant actions. Participants 
were then asked to rate their attributions for 
why Mary volunteered along a similar 7-point scale used 
in Experiment 1. 
 
To obtain a baseline estimate of the extent to which 
volunteering was considered to be a dispositional/situational 
motive for nursing students, an additional group 
of participants was asked simply to assume that Mary was 
a nursing student who was asked to volunteer without 
exposure to any stereotypically inconsistent information. 
Thus, the design of Experiment 2 included three 
between-subject conditions (high-inconsistency–same 
target; high-inconsistency–different target; no inconsistency 
control). In addition to the probe question used 
in Experiment 1, participants in this study were asked 
whether they were nursing majors.4 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: 
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2 
 
Participants’ rating scores in Experiment 1 were 
entered into a 2 (group member identity) x 2 (inconsistency) 
between-subjects ANOVA. The analysis revealed a 
main effect of the target identity variable, F(1, 101) = 
25.97, p < .001, and a marginally significant inconsistency 
main effect, F(1, 101) = 2.94, p < .09. These effects were 
qualified by a Target Identity × Inconsistency interaction, 
F(1, 101) = 39.80, p < .001. This interaction was 
interpreted via planned comparisons. As expected, participants 
who read about the aberrant behaviors of the 
minister attributed his generosity in volunteering to the 
dimension that was more inconsistent with the 
dispositional attribution of ministers—impressing others 
(M = 2.26)—in contrast to the same target control 
participants (M= 4.62), F(1, 101) = 34.06, p < .01. On the 
other hand, participants in the fellow group member 
condition attributed the other minister’s generosity to 
the dimension that was more consistent with the disposition 
of ministers (M = 5.61) in contrast to comparable 
control participants who were not exposed to the inconsistent 
actions (M= 4.26), F(1, 101) = 10.31, p < .01. Thus, 
exposure to the previous aberrant behavior of a minister 
produced stronger dispositional attributions for 
another group member’s stereotypically consistent 
behavior.5 
 
A conceptually similar pattern of results was obtained 
in Experiment 2. The results of the one-factor between subjects 
ANOVA revealed significant differences 
between conditions, F(2, 58) = 39.23, p < .0001. Planned 
comparisons among the cell means indicated that participants 
weighted factors that were inconsistent with 
the dispositional character of nurses more heavily in 
their attributions of the nursing student’s charity work 
when she was described previously as performing 
stereotypically inconsistent behaviors (M = 1.75) than 
did control participants (M = 3.81), F(1, 58) = 33.59, p < 
.001. In contrast, participants who had read about the 
aberrant behavior of the nursing student rated the charity 
work of another nursing student as more consistent 
with nurses’ dispositional character (M = 4.89) than did 
control participants (M = 3.81), F(1, 58) = 9.23, p < .01. 
Thus, Experiment 2 provided a conceptual replication 
of Experiment 1 in demonstrating a role of compensatory 
motives on attributions of causality. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: EXPERIMENT 3 
 
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 dovetail with our 
previous research (e.g., C. E. Seta et al., 1998; J. J. Seta & 
Seta, 1993) in suggesting that exposure to stereotypically 
inconsistent behavior often invokes a motive to compensate 
for this deviance by expecting hyperconsistent 
behavior on the part of another group member, thereby 
increasing the weight of attributions that are consistent 
with the disposition of the actor. In these studies, both 
the aberrant actor and the fellow group members were 
related via their common group membership. The theoretical 
rationale for the obtained predictions of extreme 
attributions vis-à-vis a fellow group member was based on 
the assumption that the attributional process was biased 
by motives to maintain the integrity of the group concept 
in the face of observed inconsistency. In an attempt to 
accomplish this, perceivers generated attributions that 
were consistent with those of the target’s group. 
It follows from this perspective that such results 
should only be obtained when the attributional target 
(e.g., fellow group member) shares a perceived unit relationship 
with the deviant actor. That is, if patterns of 
attributions are colored by motives to maintain existing 
concepts, then these motives would only be operative 
when such attributions are potentially functional in 
meeting the maintenance goal. Please note, we are not 
assuming that such attributions result in the successful 
maintenance of extant stereotypes; they may or may not 
result in stereotype maintenance. Rather, the assumption 
in this and our prior work is that attributional and 
expectation-generation processes (and even behavior) 
are biased in the direction of stereotype/concept maintenance. 
If this reasoning is correct, we should observe 
these biases only in contexts in which attributional targets 
are related to the aberrant targets; for example, 
when they are members of the stereotyped group “under 
threat.” 
 
However, if some sort of perceptual contrast is operative 
in the setting, then the attributional target would be 
expected to appear more extreme in contrast to the 
aberrant actor regardless of his or her relationship to the 
actor. That is, if exposure to a deviant group member 
leads individuals to perceive a subsequent target in a 
more extreme light in contrast to the actor, any distinct 
target may be subject to this process (e.g., Martin & Seta, 
1983; Stapel & Spears, 1996). 
 
Study 3 assessed this prediction by varying whether 
the attributional target did or did not share a group unit 
relationship with an aberrantly behaving group member. 
The target was either a member of the actor’s group 
or was not a fellow group member. If perceptual contrast 
effects underlie observed attributional patterns, then 
both the fellow group and different group member target 
conditions should show more extreme attributions 
than controls. However, if compensatory motivations are 
operative, then extreme attributions should be evidenced 
in the fellow group member versus the different 
group member condition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 3 
 
Participants and Design 
 
Seventy-two female students from introductory psychology 
classes served as participants and received partial 
credit for their research requirements. The design 
factorially crossed two levels of inconsistency (no inconsistency 
control and an inconsistent experimental condition) 
with two levels of fellow group member target identity 
(same group, different group). 
 
 
Procedure 
 
Participants were oriented to the experiment in a 
manner identical to the previously described methods. 
Inconsistent information was given about a nurse who 
was “red faced, grasping a small child by the collar and 
slapping him painfully in the face”: the inconsistent condition. 
This information was not presented to control 
condition participants. Participants read that a member 
of the community asked a different nurse (in the same 
group identity condition) or asked a salesperson (in the 
inconsistent different group identity condition) to 
donate the better part of a Saturday to help an organization 
while in the presence of others. All participants were 
asked the likelihood that this person donated time 
because she was truly a generous person or because she 
simply wanted to impress. Participants rated their attributions 
along a 7-point scale in which a 1 indicated that 
the person volunteered because she simply wanted to 
impress, whereas a 7 indicated that the person volunteered 
because she was truly generous. Control nurse 
and control salesperson participants were asked the 
same question. The only difference was that they were 
not exposed to the inconsistent information concerning 
a nurse’s inconsistent behavior.6 
 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: EXPERIMENT 3 
 
Participants’ rating scores were entered into a 2 x 2 
between-subjects analysis of variance. Table 1 contains 
the means of the four experimental conditions. The 
analysis revealed a significant Fellow Group Member 
Identity (same group or different group) x Inconsistency 
interaction, F(1, 60) = 5.55, p < .03. Neither main 
effect reached significance. 
 
To interpret this interaction, and to test our specific 
predictions, we used the error term of the overall analysis 
to make specific comparisons. Planned comparisons 
indicated that, in the same group condition, participants 
in the inconsistent condition had ratings that were significantly 
more related to the internal characteristics of 
nurses than control participants, F(1, 60) = 7.97, p < .01. 
In the different group condition, participants’ ratings in 
the inconsistent condition did not statistically differ from 
those of control group participants, F(1, 60) = 0.21, ns. 
These results add to those obtained in Experiments 1 
and 2 in supporting our assumption that patterns of attributions 
result from perceivers attempt to maintain stereotypic 
views in the face of inconsistent information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceivers made more extreme internal attributions of a 
related group member. They did not, however, change 
their attribution of a person who was not associated with 
the target group. This was expected because a person 
who is not associated with the target’s group does not 
help maintain the target’s stereotype; salespersons do 
not share the trait of “generosity” with the nurse stereotype. 
Thus, as expected, compensatory attributions were 
seen in the different nurse condition but not in the different 
group identity condition. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
 
Kunda and Oleson (1997) measured the strength of 
perceivers’ stereotypes after providing them with information 
concerning a deviant group member. In one 
study, they found that the strength of a perceiver’s stereotype 
was enhanced following information about an 
extremely deviant group member. 
 
Although Kunda and Oleson (1997) did not provide a 
direct test of their perspective, they offered two potential 
reasons for their effects. One reason involved perceptual 
contrast. Following exposure to an extremely deviant 
group member, they reasoned that perceivers contrasted 
the prototypical group member with the deviant, resulting 
in an especially strong stereotype (perceptual contrast 
also was discussed by J. J. Seta & Seta, 1993). Their 
second reason involved surprise; because perceivers 
were surprised by the extremely deviant group member, 
they searched their knowledge structure for information 
that confirmed their original stereotype, and because 
they could easily construe information that confirmed 
their stereotype, their search resulted in an especially 
strong stereotype. 
 
Although Study 3 suggests that a simple form of perceptual 
contrast does not account for our findings, it 
does not rule out the operation of active search processes 
for stereotype-confirming information. Indeed, 
similar to Kunda and Oleson (1997), our model also 
involves active search processes. However, we assume 
that active search processes follow from an implicit or 
explicit attempt to maintain a schema (mood, goal, or 
expectation). From our view, this search is initiated by 
perceivers’ motivation to maintain a stereotype, not 
because they are simply surprised by the deviant’s abnormal 
actions or characteristics. 
 
One way to distinguish our view from that of Kunda 
and Oleson (1997) would be to demonstrate that 
perceivers who are motivated to maintain a stereotype 
engage in more compensation than those who have a 
lesser degree of motivation to maintain a stereotype. In 
contrast to the view of Kunda and Oleson, our analysis 
specifies specific compensatory motives assumed to 
underlie social judgments. To test this assumption, we 
can compare the responses of individuals who differ in 
their motivation to maintain their schema in the face of 
inconsistent information. Individuals who are especially 
motivated to maintain their schema also should be especially 
inclined to demonstrate the influence of compensatory 
motives following observed inconsistency. 
 
An individual difference methodology, using individuals 
who were differentially motivated to maintain a 
group concept, has provided evidence in support of our 
interpretation (C. E. Seta et al., 1998). Following information 
about a deviant group member, highly motivated 
individuals demonstrated compensatory expectations, 
whereas individuals low in motivation did not. Although 
this study provided support for our motivation interpretation, 
it is not entirely clear whether these results were 
due to differences in perceivers’ motivation or to differences 
in their knowledge structure. In Experiment 4, we 
attempted to control for these types of effects by altering 
participants’ motivation within the experimental session. 
To vary motivation, some participants were given 
information that we expected would increase their motivation 
to maintain a stereotype, whereas others were 
given information that would decrease motivation. If 
perceivers’ motivation to maintain their schema is a critical 
dimension, then individuals who were given information 
to bolster their motivation should demonstrate 
effects of compensatory motives in their social judgments 
in contrast to those given information that weakened 
this motivation. 
 
In this experiment, we manipulated participants’ levels 
of motivation by describing belief-maintenance as a 
process either that had been found or had not been 
found to lead individuals to be successful in life and 
relationships. For example, in the high-motivation condition, 
we told participants that research showed that 
persons who hold on to their beliefs in the face of 
disconfirming evidence are found to be successful in 
their relationships. In the low-maintenance condition, 
participants were told that holding on to beliefs in the 
face of disconfirming information was nonfunctional 
and led individuals to be unsuccessful in relationships. 
Onthe surface, these manipulations may appear to be 
rather heavy handed and artificial. One response to the 
criticism of artificiality is that this is an advantage of laboratory 
research, which allows us to construct contexts 
appropriate for theory testing that do not occur in the 
real world. But, regardless of this advantage, it is clear 
that differential motivations to maintain preexisting 
beliefs of the type used in this study do occur naturally. 
For example, many women believe that holding on to 
previous attitudes about their partners in the face of 
disconfirming evidence, such as abuse, will ultimately 
lead to a successful relationship, whereas other women 
more quickly revise their beliefs in the context of similar 
information. Although there are individual differences 
that underlie these orientations, contextual variables are 
also potent determinants of these motivations (e.g., 
interdependence theory). 
 
We formulated our hypotheses so that they would not 
conform to potential demands that on the surface may 
seem to be apparent in this context. For example, in the 
high-motivation condition, participants were exposed to 
an actor who responded in a manner inconsistent with 
their extant stereotypes. If participants simply conform 
to instructions to maintain their preexisting views in the 
face of disconfirming evidence, then their responses 
should be similar to those of control condition participants. 
However, predictions made in the study called for 
participants in the high-motivation condition to be different 
from controls; specifically, these participants were 
expected to respond with relatively more extreme internal 
attributions (consistent with the character of the 
actor) concerning the stereotypically consistent behavior 
of a group member. 
 
 
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 4 
 
Participants, Design, and Procedures 
 
Eighty-seven female students from introductory psychology 
classes served as participants. The general procedures 
were identical to those described in the other 
studies. The design factorially crossed two levels of motivation 
to maintain a stereotype (low or high) with two 
levels of inconsistency (no inconsistency control and an 
inconsistency experimental condition). 
Participants were first given the motivation manipulation. 
In the high-motivation condition, they read that 
prominent researchers believed that individuals who 
were motivated to maintain their stereotypes were likely 
to be successful in life (e.g., in relationships). They were 
then given an example of a woman who “believes that 
men who belong to a particular group—a group that she 
has known for a long time—are generally positive.” They 
were then told, 
 
These researchers believe that this woman should maintain 
her attitude toward this group even if one of the 
members behaves in a negative way. They believe that 
she should try to maintain her attitude toward this group 
even if she finds that a particular group member has 
acted in a negative way. 
 
In the low-motivation condition, participants read 
that prominent researchers believed that individuals 
who were motivated to maintain their stereotype were 
likely to be unsuccessful in life (e.g., in relationships). 
They were then given an example of a woman who “believes 
that men who belong to a particular group—a 
group that she has recently been acquainted with—are 
generally positive.” They were then told that, 
 
These researchers believe that this woman should not 
maintain her attitude toward the group if one of the 
members behaves in a negative way. They believe that 
she should not try to maintain her attitude toward this 
group when she finds out that a particular group member 
has acted in a negative way. 
 
In both motivation conditions, participants were told 
that the experimenter wanted them to think about how 
they felt about the information they just read and that 
the experimenter would ask them their opinion at the 
end of the session. 
 
Participants in the inconsistent condition were given 
information identical to that described earlier about a 
female nursing student who slapped a child. They were 
then given the information about a different nursing student 
(Mary) who was asked to donate time to charity in 
the presence of other nursing students. 
 
All participants were then asked the likelihood that 
this female nursing student donated her time because 
she is a truly generous person or because she simply 
wanted to impress, using the 7-point scale in which a 1 
indicated that the nurse volunteered because she simply 
wanted to impress and 7 indicated that she volunteered 
because she was truly generous. No-inconsistency control 
participants were treated identically with the exception 
that they were not exposed to the inconsistent information. 
As in the prior studies, participants were asked 
the probe question concerning the identity of the rating 
target.7 Following these procedures, participants were 
debriefed and thanked for their participation. 
 
 
Results and Discussion: 
Experiment 4 
 
Participants’ rating scores were entered into a 
between-subjects ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant 
Motivation × Inconsistency interaction, F(1, 71) = 
4.33, p < .05. Table 2 contains the means for each of our 
four conditions.8 To interpret this effect, and to test our 
specific predictions, we used the error term of the overall 
analysis to make specific comparisons. Planned comparisons 
indicated that participants in the high-motivation 
inconsistent condition had more extreme attributions 
(consistent with the internal character of nurses) than 
those in the low-motivation inconsistent condition, F(1, 
71) = 6.99, p < .02, whereas the ratings of low- and high-motivation 
control participants did not differ, F(1, 71) = 
.01, ns. Furthermore, participants in the high-motivation 
inconsistent condition had more extreme internal attributions 
than those of control participants, F(1, 71) = 
4.16, p < .05, whereas the ratings of participants in the 
low-motivation inconsistent condition did not differ 
from that of control participants, F(1, 71) = 1.22, ns. In 
fact, they were somewhat lower than those of control 
participants. 
 
The results of Experiment 4 are entirely consistent 
with our expectations. As expected, an effect of compensation 
on attributions was obtained in the high-motivation 
condition. And, as expected, this effect was 
not obtained in the low-motivation condition. These 
results argue for an interpretation in which perceivers’ 
motivation to maintain stereotypic beliefs is a critical 
dimension for the generation of attributions. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: EXPERIMENT 5 
 
Our view assumes that perceivers attempt to maintain 
a stereotype in the face of inconsistent information by 
engaging in compensation and that compensation typically 
occurs at the component level. That is, in an 
attempt to maintain a stereotype, perceivers alter their 
judgment of an individual who comprises membership 
of the group. In so doing, the overall evaluation of the 
target group may be maintained. However, as previously 
noted, this model does not assume that compensatory 
processes always lead to the successful maintenance of 
extant group concepts. Rather, the model posits that 
maintenance motives influence judgments about group 
members in a direction that is compensatory in nature. 
 
In contrast, Kunda and Oleson’s (1997) research was 
concerned with how the stereotype itself changes as a 
result of receiving inconsistent information about a tar- 
get group member. In their studies, participants were 
first given information about a deviant group member. 
After evaluating the deviant group member, participants 
were asked about their stereotype—they were asked to 
judge members of the group, in general. Their assumption 
was that perceivers’ judgment of a group member is 
equivalent to their judgment of the stereotype. Our view 
does not make this assumption. Rather, we assume that 
perceivers can attempt to compensate at the individual 
level while attempting to maintain their stereotype. Individuals 
can have a hyperconsistent view of a fellow group 
member while maintaining a different view of members 
in general (their stereotype). Consequently, judgments 
of a fellow group member can be significantly affected by 
the inconsistent actions of the target, whereas stereotypes 
may be largely unaffected by this information. 
Experiment 5 was designed to test this idea. We asked 
some participants about a fellow group member, 
whereas others were given a stereotype question about 
members of the group in general. This question was conceptually 
similar to the one used by Kunda and Oleson 
(1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 5 
 
Participants, Design, and Procedure 
 
Seventy-eight female students from introductory psychology 
classes served as participants. The design 
included three group conditions: no inconsistency control 
(measuring judgments of nurses, in general) and 
two inconsistent target conditions—one that measured 
judgments of a fellow group member (inconsistent fellow 
group member condition) and one that measured 
judgments of nurses, in general (inconsistent stereotype 
condition). 
 
Participants were oriented to the study in a manner 
identical to the previously described procedures. In this 
study, all participants read that there are approximately 
65,000 female student nurses in the country. In the no 
inconsistency control condition, participants were asked 
to consider that “if all of the student nurses were asked to 
donate the better part of a Saturday to help an organization, 
what would be the likelihood that they would help 
because they are, in general, truly generous?” They 
responded on a 7-point scale where 1 represented not at 
all generous and 7 represented truly generous. Participants 
in the inconsistent stereotype target condition were also 
presented this information. However, before being 
asked the likelihood question concerning the entire 
population of student nurses, participants in this condition 
first read information about a female student nurse 
who slapped the child. 
 
In the inconsistent fellow group target condition, participants 
were exposed to the procedures described 
above; however, they were not asked about their opinion 
of the entire population of student nurses. Rather, they 
were asked the likelihood that a different female nursing 
student would help because she is truly generous on the 
7-point scale described above. In this study, our probe 
question simply asked whether our noncontrol participants 
evaluated an entire population (65,000 student 
nurses) or a different individual. All participants gave 
the correct answer. 
 
 
Results and Discussion: 
Experiment 5 
 
Participants’ scores were entered into a three-factor 
between-subjects ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant 
condition main effect, F(2, 75) = 5.60, p < .005. To 
interpret this effect, and to test our specific predictions, 
we used the error term of the overall analysis to make 
specific comparisons. Planned comparisons indicated 
that participants in the inconsistent fellow group member 
target condition (M = 5.01) had more extreme attributions 
that were consistent with the internal character 
of nurses than those in the no inconsistency control (M= 
4.09), F(1, 75) = 10.2, p < .01. The results conceptually 
replicate those obtained in Experiments 1 through 4. In 
addition, the judgments of participants in the fellow 
group member target condition were significantly more 
consistent with the internal character of nurses than 
those in the inconsistent stereotype target condition (M= 
4.25), F(1, 75) = 6.56, p < .05. Furthermore, judgments in 
the inconsistent stereotype condition did not differ from 
those in the no inconsistency control (M = 4.09), F(1, 
75) = .31, p > .60. 
 
These results are entirely consistent with our predictions. 
Perceivers had more extreme attributions that 
were consistent with the character of nurses following 
exposure to the inconsistent actions of a deviant nurse. 
They did not, however, change their view of nurses, in 
general. Their judgments in the inconsistent stereotype 
condition did not differ from those in the control condition. 
Thus, these results suggest that judgments about a 
particular group member can reflect compensatory processes, 
whereas judgments about the stereotyped group 
per se remain relatively equivalent to conditions in 
which no inconsistency was encountered. Therefore, it 
appears that the overall evaluation of the group stereotype 
was maintained in the face of inconsistency. This 
pattern of results is quite different from that of Kunda 
and Oleson (1997), who found hyperconsistent judgments 
of the group stereotype in their research. It may 
be the case that Kunda and Oleson’s results were 
obtained because participants in their study rated the 
person who performed the inconsistent action immediately 
before being asked about the group stereotype. 
This procedure may have produced response scale shifts 
such that participants’ group ratings were inflated following 
their previous negative evaluations of the inconsistent 
actor. 
 
The present results also provide evidence that 
perceivers did not compare and contrast the valence of 
the target’s actions to that of other group members. If 
this was the case, the judgments of participants in the 
inconsistent stereotype target condition should have 
been more extreme than that of those in the control 
condition. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: EXPERIMENT 6 
 
Experiment 6 was designed to provide a test of our 
model’s capability component. In Experiment 4 and in 
prior research (C. E. Seta et al., 1998), we have shown 
that perceivers compensate if they are motivated to 
maintain their stereotype. However, this does not mean 
that they will always be capable of accessing or generating 
information that can potentially compensate for all 
types of inconsistent actions. For example, perceivers 
with a certain level of motivation may be capable of compensating 
for the inconsistent action of one target but 
not those of multiple actors. Experiment 6 was designed 
to determine if perceivers are capable of compensating 
for the inconsistent actions of one target nursing student, 
but not those of multiple nursing students. 
In addition to supporting our capability assumption, 
the expected results also would provide additional evidence 
against an interpretation in which perceivers compare 
the valence of the target’s behavior to that of a fellow 
group member. If this type of contrast is occurring, 
perceivers should see the action of a fellow group member 
as especially positive after observing the inconsistent 
actions of both multiple and individual targets. 
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 6 
 
Participants, Design, and Procedures 
 
Seventy-seven female students from introductory psychology 
classes served as participants and received partial 
credit for their research requirements.9 The design 
included three group conditions: a no inconsistency 
control and two inconsistent group conditions. In the 
two inconsistent group conditions, participants read 
either about the inconsistent actions of a single group 
member (single actor condition) or about multiple 
actors (multiple actor condition). The orientation of 
participants in this study was identical to that of the previous 
studies. However, participants in the multiactor 
inconsistent condition read about a nursing student who 
slapped a child and a different nursing student who 
taunted an old man. Participants in the single actor 
inconsistent condition were presented these inconsistent 
actions as performed by one nursing student. Participants 
in both inconsistency conditions were asked 
about the likelihood of a different nurse donating her 
time, in the manner described in the previous studies. 
Control participants were asked the same question but 
were not exposed to inconsistent information. 
 
 
RESULTS: EXPERIMENT 6 
 
Participants’ rating scores were entered into a three-factor 
between-subjects analysis of variance. The analysis 
revealed a significant group main effect, F(2, 56) = 6.01, 
p < .01. To interpret this effect, and to test our specific 
predictions, we used the error term of the overall analysis 
to make specific comparisons. Planned comparisons 
indicated that participants in the inconsistent single 
actor condition (M = 5.53) had more extreme attributions 
that were consistent with the disposition of nurses 
than those in the control condition (M= 4.24), F(1, 56) = 
9.32, p < .01, whereas the attributions of participants in 
the multiple actor condition (M = 4.26) did not differ 
from that of control participants, F(1, 56) = .0001, ns. 
 
 
DISCUSSION: EXPERIMENT 6 
 
The results of Experiment 6 are entirely consistent 
with our expectations. First, we found that participants 
in the single group member actor condition had more 
extreme attributions that were consistent with the internal 
character of nurses than those in the control condition. 
The novel finding in this study involved the ratings 
of participants in the multiple group member actor’s 
condition. The attributions of these participants did not 
differ from those of controls, and they were significantly 
less consistent with the internal character of the actors 
than those of participants in the singular group member 
actor condition. Thus, when participants were exposed 
to the inconsistent actions of two different nurses, they 
did not interpret a fellow group member’s behavior in a 
compensatory manner. Therefore, just as participants in 
Experiments 1 and 2 did not interpret the target’s behavior 
in a compensatory manner following the target’s own 
inconsistent actions, participants in Experiment 6 did 
not interpret the actions of a fellow group member in a 
compensatory manner after observing the inconsistent 
actions of two different targets. 
 
These data suggest that it may take a larger number of 
inconsistent actions to constrain compensation in the 
context of a fellow group member (e.g., it took the 
inconsistent actions of two target persons) than to constrain 
compensation in the context of the person performing 
the inconsistent actions (e.g., it only took the 
inconsistent actions of the target to constrain compensation 
in Experiments 1 and 2). As discussed in the introduction, 
there are several reasons why a perceiver can 
expect compensation from a fellow group member but 
not from the target of the inconsistent action. First, the 
assumed variability among members is often greater 
than the assumed variability in a single individual’s 
behavior (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). In addition, 
the implications of inconsistent actions are more directly 
tied to the personality of the target of the inconsistent 
action than to the personality of a fellow group member. 
Thus, it follows that it should take an objectively less 
severe inconsistent action (or fewer inconsistent 
actions) to constrain a perceiver’s capability of generating 
compensatory expectations and attributions about 
the acting target versus a fellow group member. 
In addition, these results provide evidence that participants 
are not comparing the valence of the target to a 
prototype member of the group. If this interpretation 
accounted for our effects, participants should have 
viewed the behavior of a fellow group member as especially 
consistent with the character of nurses after observing 
the highly inconsistent actions of multiple targets. 
This was not the case. 
 
 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Attributions play an important role in theoretical 
accounts of social behavior, and attributional processes 
have been the subject of considerable research (see 
Fiske & Taylor, 1991, for a review). The results of the 
present research add to this body of knowledge by demonstrating 
an influence of compensatory motivation on 
patterns of attribution. In particular, results show that 
perceivers are biased toward relatively extreme stereotypical 
internal attributions of group members’ behaviors 
when previously exposed to behaviors that are 
inconsistent with stereotypic expectations. These attributions 
could potentially compensate for the inconsistency. 
Thus, attributional processes were shown to be 
biased by motives to maintain stereotype concepts. 
The present research also complements existing 
research on attributional mechanisms of stereotype 
maintenance. For example, the type of attribution a 
perceiver makes about an inconsistent action can influence 
whether a person who behaves in an aberrant manner 
is subtyped, that is, seen as an “exception to the rule” 
(e.g., Crocker et al., 1983; Johnston & Hewstone, 1992; 
Weber & Crocker, 1983). Subtyping and compensation 
can work in tandem. It should be pointed out, however, 
that whereas subtyping and compensation can work in 
tandem, compensation does not require subtyping—as 
has been shown, for example, by the finding that 
perceivers can compensate via the target himself or herself 
(J. J. Seta & Seta, 1993). 
 
The results of the present studies demonstrate that 
interpretations of the behavior of group members who 
are related to targets only by virtue of category membership 
also are influenced by the inconsistent behavior of 
the deviant. Thus, this research demonstrates that the 
aberrant behavior of a deviant group member not only 
affects attributions about that person’s behavior but also 
affects attributions about other members of the stereotyped 
group. This finding has important implications for 
the resistance of stereotypes to change, which will be 
elaborated on further in this article. In brief, because the 
assumed variability among members of a group is often 
greater than the assumed variability in a single individual’s 
behavior, the generation of compensation at the 
group level is possible when it may not be possible at the 
individual level. Furthermore, the implications of inconsistent 
actions are tied more directly to the personality of 
the target of the inconsistent actions than to the personality 
of fellow group members. Thus, these processes 
may constitute a strong force against stereotype change. 
Study 5 demonstrated that judgments about individual 
group members may not be identical to stereotypic 
judgments about members of the group in general. In 
this study, we used a stereotype measure that was conceptually 
similar to the one used by Kunda and Oleson 
(1997). From our model, individuals may exhibit 
extreme compensatory judgments about members of a 
group while maintaining their extant group stereotype. 
That is, attributions and expectations concerning a particular 
group member may reflect compensatory processes, 
whereas judgments about the stereotyped group 
per se remain equivalent to conditions in which no 
inconsistency is observed. In addition to ruling out simple 
contrast explanations for these findings, this result 
suggests that compensatory processes do potentially 
serve the function of maintaining, while not necessarily 
strengthening, existing stereotypes. 
 
The results of Experiment 6 demonstrated that inconsistent 
actions on the part of several group members constrain 
perceivers’ capability of compensating via different 
members of stereotyped groups. In Experiment 6, 
the ratings of participants in the multiple actor inconsistent 
condition were not more compensatory than control 
group participants, and they were less compensatory 
than those of participants in the inconsistent single actor 
condition. 
This research also demonstrated that the generation 
of compensatory attributions involves motivation. For 
example, in Study 4, priming or framing participants 
with arguments pro or con the utility of maintaining/ 
changing extant beliefs had the effect of influencing the 
generation of compensatory attributions. 
 
 
Contrast and Compensation 
 
These experiments rule out various alternative interpretations. 
They, for example, rule out a contrast interpretation 
in which perceivers compare the target to a 
prototypic member of the group. It should be pointed 
out, however, that contrast (and assimilation) can be 
used as descriptive terms. Contrast refers to the fact that 
one stimulus moves away from another, whereas assimilation 
refers to the fact that one stimulus moves toward 
another. If contrast is used in a descriptive manner, then 
a person may want to substitute the term motivated contrast 
for compensation in our analysis while maintaining 
our key assumptions. For example, perceivers, to maintain 
their stereotype, can be viewed as contrasting the fellow 
group member to the target. In this case, people are 
motivated to move their evaluations and valuations of a 
fellow group member away from the group mean to 
maintain the stereotype. This will occur if perceivers are 
motivated to maintain their stereotype and if they can 
generate or access information that is compensatory in 
nature. In this case, motivated contrast is being used in 
place of compensation. It is being used to portray a process 
by which perceivers compensate for one inconsistency 
by altering another action. If contrast is used in this 
way (i.e., by incorporating our key assumptions), then it 
is not necessary to tease apart a contrast interpretation 
(or other interpretations with similar meanings) from 
our schema maintenance through compensation analysis. 
We have chosen the word compensation (e.g., J. J. Seta 
& Seta, 1992, 1993) instead of motivated contrast 
because compensation implies that a person is motivated 
to counterbalance an observed inconsistency. 
 
Implications for the resistance of stereotypes and attitudes. 
Not only do the results of our experiments support the 
idea that perceivers compensated in an attempt to maintain 
their stereotype, but the results of Experiment 5, in 
particular, suggest that compensation may result in successful 
stereotype maintenance. Following an inconsistent 
action on the part of a group member, perceivers 
evaluated a different behavior of a different group member 
in a hyperconsistent manner. However, using a stereotype 
measure that was conceptually similar to one 
used by Kunda and Oleson (1997), we found that a separate 
group of participants did not change their stereotype 
following observed inconsistency. Assuming that 
these participants also would have generated 
compensatory attributions if assigned to the different 
group member target condition (e.g., that there were no 
failures of random assignment), this result supports the 
idea that compensation can result in successful stereotype 
maintenance. It also implies that compensation can 
help prevent different types of schema from changing, 
such as goals and attitudes. 
 
After exposure to the inconsistent actions of a target 
group member, perceivers can maintain their overall 
group stereotype in a number of different ways. One way 
is to modify their expectations and attributions about 
how and why a different group member performed the 
same behavior as the target; to balance the inconsistent 
actions of a target, the different group member’s actions 
are perceived to be hyperconsistent. In this way, 
perceivers are maintaining the content as well as the 
overall evaluative nature of their stereotype. The overall 
evaluative nature of a nurse stereotype, for example, is 
maintained if one component of the stereotype balances 
a different component. Although the overall evaluative 
nature of nurses may be maintained, exposure to inconsistency 
and the generation of compensatory judgments 
also might lead to changes in stereotype content or 
variability. 
 
 
Summary 
 
The results of all six experiments provide support for 
the key assumptions of our schema-maintenance 
through compensation analysis. In addition, they add to 
the body of knowledge concerning attributions in demonstrating 
the role of compensatory motivation on patterns 
of attributions. 
 
 
Caveats 
 
In this article, we have discussed situations in which 
individuals were attempting to keep their view of a particular 
group from changing. However, a schema can be 
dynamic, such as when a person is interested in becoming 
progressively better and better at a particular skill 
(e.g., Wood, 1989). In this situation, because the goal is 
improvement, we are attempting to maintain a situation 
in which our outcomes and activities are progressively 
more and more positive. So, for example, if we are 
attempting to maintain the goal of increasing our net 
worth each year, we will attempt to generate activities 
that will satisfy this upwardly mobile goal. 
 
Although research has not explicitly dealt with a 
schema of the sort we have just discussed, it has dealt with 
situations in which the schema was related to the activities 
of the perceiver rather than to the activities of other 
individuals (e.g., J. J. Seta et al., 1993; J. J. Seta & Seta, 
1982). Therefore, our analysis is applicable to situations 
in which the perceiver is the actor as well as the observer. 
 
  
NOTES 
 
1. There are circumstances in which schema change is desirable. 
For example, at times we have a goal to self-improve (e.g.,Wood, 1989). 
In these situations, because the goal is improvement, we are attempting 
to maintain change rather than the status quo.We will discuss situations 
like this in the General Discussion. 
 
2. It should be pointed out that our model makes relative and not 
absolute predictions. For example, we cannot predict the exact level of 
an inconsistent event (or the exact number of inconsistent events) that 
will constrain perceivers’ capability of compensating.We can, however, 
make relative predictions about the conditions that make it more or 
less likely to compensate. 
 
3. The data of 7 participants were not included because they did not 
properly identify the person they were evaluating. The materials presented 
in this and subsequent studies were complex, and if participants 
did not pay careful attention they misread or confused the information. 
 
4. Six participants indicated that they majored in nursing and were 
excluded from the study. Also, 6 people were excluded from our study 
for giving the incorrect answer on our probe question. 
 
5. Perceivers may have believed that the actions of the inconsistently 
behaving nurse who was asked to volunteer were known to the 
other fellow group members. If the actions of the inconsistently behaving 
nurse were known, the fellow group member might be especially 
inclined to want to impress (e.g., have self-presentational motives). To 
rule out this possibility, we gave the scenarios used in this research to a 
separate group of participants. These participants (n = 18) were asked 
whether the fellow group member nurse would want to impress a 
group of other nurses—after they witnessed the inconsistent target’s 
behavior—in contrast to a situation in which the information about the 
inconsistently behaving nurse was not known.Ona 5-point scale where 
1 represented wants to impress most when information was known, 5 represented 
wants to impress most when information was not known, and 3 represented 
no difference, results revealed no difference in estimates of “volunteering 
to impress” across these two situations (M = 3.2, where 3 
represented no difference), F(1, 17) = .25, ns. Thus, explanations based 
on the idea that the manipulation either increased or decreased 
assumed self-presentational motives are not viable. 
 
6. Eight participants were excluded from the study for giving the 
incorrect answer on our probe question, which was conceptually similar 
to the one used in Experiment 1. 
 
7. Twelve people were excluded from our study for giving the incorrect 
answer on our probe question, which was conceptually similar to 
the one used in Experiment 2. 
 
8. Methodological changes incorporated into Study 4, including 
group salience and name changes, most probably accounted for discrepancies 
between the control groups in this study and the controls in 
our previous nursing studies. 
 
9. Four participants indicated that they majored in nursing and 
were excluded from the study. Also, 14 participants gave an incongruent 
answer for the question asking them about the person that they 
evaluated and were excluded from the study. 
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